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People often use spatial metaphors (e.g., think “laterally,”“outside the box”) to describe exploration of the problem space during creative problem solving. In this paper, we probe the
potential cognitive underpinnings of these spatial metaphors. Drawing on theories of situative cognition, semantic foraging theory, and environmental psychology, we formulate and
test the hypothesis that larger physical spaces can facilitate divergent (but not convergent)
processes in problem space exploration. Across two experiments, participants worked on
a battery of problem solving tasks intended to represent divergent (alternative uses, shape
invention) and convergent (remote associates, letter extrapolation) problem solving processes
in either a large or a small room. In Experiment 1, participants in the larger room produced
more novel alternative uses for everyday objects, and created more novel shape inventions,
but generated less practical alternative uses, than participants in the smaller room. In Experiment 2, participants in the larger room (including a variant larger room) also produced more
novel alternative uses for everyday objects, and less practical alternative uses, than participants in a small room, but did not create more novel shape inventions. These results suggest that spatial metaphors for problem space exploration may reflect meaningful cognitive
phenomena: People may be able to search more broadly in a problem space if they are in an
environment where broad physical search is a salient affordance; however, this effect appears
to be relatively small and may depend on having sufficiently motivated participants.

INTRODUCTION
A key component of creative problem solving is exploration of
the problem space. The problem space is typically described
as the mental representation of the problem, including the
initial problem description, goal, and operators (i.e., strategies) to move from the initial state to the goal state (Newell &
Simon, 1972). Theories of creative problem solving posit that
the effective initial exploration of the problem space—sometimes called “divergence” or “divergent thinking” (Guilford,
1956)—is critical to produce a successful solution (Amabile,
1983; Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1996; Sawyer, 2012; Simonton,
2011; Wallas, 1926; Warr & O’Neill, 2005). Effective problem
space exploration can be supported by considering many different solution approaches (Adánez, 2005; Chan et al., 2011;
Parnes & Meadow, 1959; Shah, Millsap, Woodward, & Smith,
2012; Torrance, 1988), increasing the variance in the quality
of solutions considered (e.g., being willing to consider “wild”
ideas; Chan et al., 2011; Girotra, Terwiesch, & Ulrich, 2010;
Terwiesch & Ulrich, 2009), considering solutions and perspectives from outside one’s discipline or problem domain (Chan
et al., 2011; Gentner & Markman, 1997; Ward, 1998), relaxing
inferred constraints about the problem description (Knoblich,

Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999; Ohlsson, 1992), and exploring alternative conceptualizations of the problem (Kaplan &
Simon, 1990; MacGregor & Cunningham, 2009). Divergence
can also be facilitated by modulation of attention: For example,
a reduction of attentional control or focus has been identified
as a key mechanism for achieving divergent thinking and making remote associations in creative problem solving (Aiello,
Jarosz, Cushen, & Wiley, 2012; Haarmann, George, Smaliy, &
Dien, 2012; Martindale, 1997; Wiley & Jarosz, 2012).
Successful exploration is often described with spatial language and imagery. For example, people commonly encourage one another to think “laterally,” not “vertically” (Bono,
1970), and “outside the box,” or to explore “broadly” (Wiley,
1998) and make “remote” associations in semantic memory
(Mednick, 1962). In this paper, our goal is to probe the potential cognitive underpinnings of these spatial metaphors. Are
these metaphors arbitrary, or merely artifacts of human
convention? Or do they identify real cognitive phenomena?
Could embodying variations in these spatial metaphors (e.g.,
large vs. small physical environments) influence the nature
of people’s search patterns in semantic space?
The present investigation is inspired by a growing body
of literature across a diverse range of tasks that suggests that
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people’s embodied physical context can have significant implications for information processing. For example, people perceive slopes as steeper if they wear a heavy vs. a light backpack
(Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999), can transfer knowledge and skills
across contexts when there is high interconnectedness across
activities and practices in those contexts (Brown, Collins, &
Duguid, 1989), and make more “holistic” decisions (i.e., integrating multiple sources of data and abstraction) in rooms
with higher vs. lower ceilings (Meyers-Levy & Zhu, 2007).
The literature provides two potential theoretical motivations
for suspecting that the spatial metaphors of creative search
have grounding in cognitive phenomena. The first account,
which we call “direct priming,” is exemplified by Hills and colleagues’ argument that goal-directed search for resources in
external spaces and search for resources in internal spaces (e.g.,
semantic memory) share a common neural substrate (Hills,
2006; Hills, Jones, & Todd, 2012; Hills, Todd, & Goldstone,
2008). Specifically, that they share dopaminergic modulation
of area-restricted search such that search is narrow in situations where the target resources have been frequently found
in the past and search becomes broad in situations where the
target resources are encountered less frequently. One intriguing implication of this argument is that expectations about the
structure of search environments in external spaces can shape
search patterns in internal spaces, or vice versa.
To test this implication, Hills et al. (2008) studied how
search patterns on an anagram task (i.e., search for as many
words as possible for a given letter set) might be shaped by
prior experience with a spatial foraging task (i.e., search for
high-value pixels in a simple 2-D computer maze). In their
experiment, participants completed spatial foraging tasks
with either “clumpy”—many pixels concentrated in a few
patches—or “diffuse”—pixels evenly distributed in the environment—resource distributions, and subsequently tried to
find as many anagrams as they could. They found that participants who had just experienced a “clumpy” distribution of
pixels took longer to switch between letter sets when searching for anagrams, consistent with expectations for a “clumpy”
distribution of anagrams (i.e., expecting letter sets to contain
more anagrams. They inferred from this that the distribution
of resources in the spatial environment primed expectations
for the distribution of “resources” in the semantic space. This
analysis suggests that the affordances in the external, physical
environment (e.g., the distribution of resources) may shape
the mind’s internal search in semantic space.
Following this line of thought, we reason that, to the extent
that large physical environments afford free movement and
exploration, they may also better facilitate divergent problem
solving (i.e., exploration of semantic space) relative to smaller,
constrained spaces. Rather than simply fostering increased
performance via increased effort, people might be sensitive
to how larger physical spaces afford freer exploration, and

consequently adopt a semantic search strategy that better
matches this resource distribution, such as by relaxing their
focus of attention from more clearly relevant or high-quality
responses to more semantically distant and varied (and likely
more novel) associations (Aiello et al., 2012; Haarmann et al.,
2012; Martindale, 1997; Wiley & Jarosz, 2012). This direct
priming of attentional focus might occur without conscious
awareness, similar to some varieties of top-down modulation
of visual attention (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007). This direct priming mechanism can also be related to the notion of “frames”
in research on situative cognition, for example, expectations
(whether explicit or tacit) about a given situation that are influenced by the affordances and constraints of particular environments, and go to shape cognition and interaction (Goffman,
1974; Greeno, 1994; Greeno & Middle-School Mathematics through Applications Project Group, 1998; Maclachlan &
Reid, 1994; Nokes-Malach & Mestre, 2013; Scherr & Hammer,
2009). Because both varieties of direct priming mechanisms
can occur without conscious awareness, we do not expect
facilitation of divergent performance to be associated with
more effortful performance. Indeed, to the extent that people
relax their focus of attention to search more broadly, we might
even expect to see a decreased perception of task difficulty as
measured by cognitive load (e.g., Antonenko, Paas, Grabner, &
Gog, 2010; Chandler & Sweller, 1991).
The second line of reasoning, which we call the “concept
activation” account, comes from research in environmental
psychology that explores how certain configurations of physical
environments can prime certain psychological states or ideas,
which can then influence later information processing. For
example, Hall (1966) argues that small and contained spaces
(e.g., chapels) can evoke notions of confinement or restrictedness, while larger spaces (e.g., cathedrals) can prime notions
of freedom and openness. Similarly, Moore, Lane, Hill, Cohen,
and McGinty (1994) suggest that lower ceilings may invoke
more restricted play, while higher ceilings may encourage
“freer” play. In the Meyers-Levy and Zhu (2007) study mentioned previously, the effect of the ceiling height manipulation
on decision making was mediated by activation of the concept
of “freedom” vs. “confinement.” This line of reasoning presents
an indirect mechanism by which larger spaces prime concepts
of “freedom” and “broadness,” which in turn induces information processing that is also “less constrained,” for example,
more holistic, as in Meyers-Levy & Zhu (2007), thereby facilitating divergent processing during problem solving.
In contrast to the direct priming account, concept activation may also be marked by affective changes (e.g., increases
in positive affect, decreases in negative affect), since concepts
related to “freedom” may have positive valence, while concepts related to “confinement” may have negative valence.
For example, a recent affective norming project found that
the word “freedom” had a highly positive valence score of
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7.72 on a 1 to 9 valence scale (1 is highly negative, 9 is highly
positive), while the word “restrict” had a much more negative valence of 3.48 out of 9 (Warriner, Kuperman, & Brysbaert, 2013). Therefore, measuring changes in affect may
be a way to distinguish between direct priming or concept
activation accounts of potential associations between physical surroundings and divergent/convergent problem solving
processes: Increased divergent performance in large physical spaces accompanied by increases in positive affect (and
decreases in negative affect) would be more consistent with
a concept activation account of the cognitive basis of spatial
imagery for divergent exploration.
Synthesizing these ideas, we test the hypothesis that larger
spaces will have a facilitation effect on divergent problem
solving processes (i.e., processes that have similar cognitive
characteristics to the exploration stage of the creative process), but not “convergent” problem solving processes (i.e.,
processes that focus on “converging” on a single “correct” or
canonical answer). To the extent that increased divergence
may be at odds with convergent processes (Goldenberg, Larson, & Wiley, 2013), larger spaces might also hinder convergent problem solving. We further hypothesize that this
facilitation would be accompanied by decreases in perceived
task difficulty. Measures of affect might help distinguish
between the direct priming and concept activation explanations of observed effects. In summary, in this paper, we
examine the following three main hypotheses.
H1: Divergent performance will be higher in larger vs.
smaller physical spaces.
H2: Convergent performance will be lower in larger vs.
smaller physical spaces.
H3: Perceived task difficulty for divergent tasks will be
lower in larger vs. smaller physical spaces.
We conducted two experiments to test these hypotheses,
first with a sample of paid volunteers, and then with a larger
sample of psychology subject pool participants and an expansion of the range of physical spaces and problem solving stimuli
that are tested. To preview our results, we find partial support
for the first two hypotheses across both experiments, and find
that these effects are not associated with changes in affect.

EXPERIMENT 1
In this study, we provide a first test of the three hypotheses.
The basic experimental approach is to have participants work
on a battery of problem solving tasks intended to represent
both divergent and convergent processing in either large or
small rooms. As noted, our hypotheses are that divergent
problem solving performance will be facilitated by being in a
large (vs. small) room, while convergent performance will be
hindered by being in the large room.

Methods
Participants
Forty-seven people (20 males, 27 females; ages 19–66, average
age 27) from the community at a large research university in the
northeastern United States participated in this study. Thirty-five
of the participants were undergraduate or graduate students at
the university. Most of the other participants were recent graduates or employees of the university or businesses on campus. All
participants were recruited through fliers posted around campus and were compensated 10 dollars for their time.
Four participants didn’t produce valid data on one of the
problem solving tasks (3 did not produce any valid inventions, and 1 did not produce any valid uses), and were therefore dropped from our analyses: There were two each from
the large and small rooms respectively.1 Therefore, our final
dataset consisted of 43 participants.
Materials
Room size manipulation. To manipulate room size, we had participants complete their problem solving tasks in one of two rooms
on campus. The “large” room was a conference auditorium (see
Fig 1, left panel). The dimensions of the room were approximately
15’ W × 30’ L × 15’ H. Participants completed their tasks on a
desk in the front of the auditorium facing toward the audience
seats so that the size of the room would be salient. Other than the
desk and chair the participants used, and the other chairs facing
the front of the auditorium, the auditorium was empty.
The “small” room was a former office space that was emptied out for the experiment (Fig 1: next page, right panel).
The dimensions of the room were approximately 8’ W × 10’
L × 8’ H. Participants completed their tasks on a desk facing
one of the walls. It was empty except for the desk and chair
the participants used.
Other than the size of the room, we made sure that the
two rooms were similar in a number of important ways,
including amount of stimuli encountered on the walk to the
room (both rooms were in the same building), ambient noise
(we chose rooms that were far from other offices in the building), and temperature (both rooms shared the same central
air conditioning system). The one potentially salient difference was the tone of lighting: the large room used incandescent lighting, while the small room used fluorescent lighting.
Problem-solving tasks
Participants completed a battery of four problem-solving
tasks intended to represent both divergent and convergent
processing: 1) an alternative uses task, 2) a shape invention
task, 3) a version of the Remote Associates Test (RAT), and 4)
a letter series extrapolation task. In this section we describe
each task along with the hypothesized processes involved.
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Alternative uses. The alternative uses task is patterned after
Guilford’s (1967) classic alternate uses task in which the
problem solver is asked to list as many uses as possible for
a common object (e.g., think of as many uses as you can
for a brick). It has been hypothesized to measure divergent
thinking processes because the output of the task is a range
of responses rather than one correct or incorrect response.
Task output is typically measured in terms of the fluency and
flexibility (e.g., novelty) of the responses. However, this task
may also involve convergent processes. People may initially
think of a variety of responses, and subsequently evaluate and
select only the uses that are both novel and practical. This
corresponds to the selection/evaluation processes/phases in
various theories of cognitive and creative production, such as
the convergent production component of Guilford’s (1956)
“structure of intellect” theory, the response validation stage of
Amabile’s (1983) process model of creativity, and the Explore
phase of Finke and colleagues’ (1996) Geneplore model.
Therefore, we hypothesize that fluency and novelty are measures of divergent thinking on this task, whereas practicality is a measure of convergent thinking. It is useful to note

that convergence may not necessarily always follow divergence: Convergence can also reflect attentional focus on
and rapid selection of the most readily accessible responses,
which are often the most successful or appropriate (Bilalić,
McLeod, & Gobet, 2008; Guilford, 1956; Luchins, 1942).
We used “SHOE” and “NEWSPAPER” as our common
object items and gave the following instructions to participants: “In this part of the experiment, your task is to list as
many uses as you can for an object (named below). For example, if the object is ‘BRICK,’ you could say ‘building material,
doorstop, anchor, etc.’ The goal is to come up with as many
uses of an object as possible. There are 2 of these problems,
and you will have 4 minutes for each.”
Shape invention. In the shape invention task (Finke et al., 1996),
the problem solver is given three three-dimensional shapes
to combine together to create as many useful objects that
belong to one of three given categories (e.g., toys and games,
transportation). Similar to the alternative uses task, we
hypothesize that this task includes elements of both divergent and convergent processing. Again, we hypothesize that

Figure 1
Picture of large room (left) and small room (right) in Experiment 1.
docs.lib.purdue.edu/jps
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novelty inventions are shown in Figure 3. Two trained coders
evaluated the uses, with high inter-rater reliability, ICC(2,2)
= .89. Three trained coders evaluated the inventions, with high
inter-rater reliability, ICC(2,3) = .85. Each use/invention’s
novelty score was the arithmetic mean of all judges’ scores for
that use/invention. Novelty scores were then aggregated into
participant-level measures in the following ways: mean novelty (how novel their uses were, on average), and max novelty
(what was the highest novelty score they achieved).

Performance on the RAT and letter series tasks were
intended to primarily reflect convergent processing, since
both tasks sought the production of a single “best” response.
One trained coder scored the RAT responses as either correct
or incorrect, using the answer key from Mednick & Mednick
(1967) and Bowers et al. (1990). Percent correct was used
for analysis. Letters series task performance was measured
by marking responses as either correct or incorrect, using
canonical answers from the prior references (Nokes, 2009;
Simon & Kotovsky, 1963), and the percent correct was used
for analysis.

Convergent measures. Both the uses and invention tasks were also
scored for practicality, to reflect convergent processing on
those tasks. Practicality scoring for the uses task was initially
done with a 4-point scale (1 – unlikely to work at all, 2 – will Other measures
work less well than conventional means, 3 – will work as well Perceived task difficulty. To measure perceived task difficulty, we
as conventional means, 4 – will work better than conven- adapted two items from prior research with cognitive load
tional means), but was collapsed to a 3-point scale because (Jang & Schunn, 2012). The measure was about the task just
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correlations between letter series and RAT measures; significant negative correlations between uses practicality and
the divergent measures). However, the correlations are generally low, explaining small amounts of common variance,
and some correlations are missing (e.g., no significant correlations between practicality and the letters series and RAT
measures, and no significant correlations between invention
practicality and any of the other measures). This suggests
that the measures do not necessarily primarily reflect the two
constructs of divergence and convergence (as we had hypothesized). Therefore, we analyze each measure separately.

Procedure
Participants were greeted and brought to either the large or
small room, depending on their assignment. They were then
informed that they would complete four problem-solving
tasks, grouped into two blocks with two problem sets each.
The uses and invention tasks formed one block, while the
RAT and letter series task formed the other block. The tasks
were counterbalanced by block, and specific problem solving
tasks within the block (RAT and letters; uses and invention).
They had eight minutes to complete each problem set, and a
one-minute warning was given before the time was up.
After each problem set, participants completed the untimed
cognitive load survey. Before they began the problem sets,
participants were asked to complete the first PANAS to get a
baseline measure. They were asked to complete a second and
third PANAS after the first and second blocks of problem sets,
respectively. Overall, the experiment ran no longer than 45
minutes. The experimenter remained in the room during the
length of the experiment, seated behind the participant.

Alternative uses
There was an effect of room size on mean fluency, with participants in the large room generating more uses (M = 25.0, SE
= 1.8) than participants in the small room (M = 19.3, SE = 1.8),
d = 0.68, 95% CI = [0.03, 1.33], F(1,41) = 5.0, p = .03. There was
also an effect of room size on mean novelty, with participants
in the large room producing higher mean novelty with their
uses (M = 1.8, SE = .09) than those in the small room (M = 1.5,
SE = .08), d = 0.78 [0.13, 1.44], F(1,41) = 6.6, p = .01 (Fig. 4, left
panel). The results were similar for max novelty: Participants in
the large room achieved marginally higher max novelty scores (M
= 3.4, SE = .19) than those in the small room (M = 2.9, SE = .18),
d = 0.61 [-0.04, 1.26], F(1,41) = 4.0, p = .05 (Fig. 4, middle panel).
In contrast, participants in the large room generated alternative uses that were significantly less practical (M = 2.5, SE
= .04) than those from the small room (M =192.7, SE = .04), d
= –1.00 [-1.68, -0.33], F(1,41) = 10.9, p = .00 (Fig. 4, right panel).

Design
This study had a between-subjects design. The independent
variable was room size, with two levels (large or small). Participants were randomly assigned to conditions. In the final
dataset, there were 21 participants in the large room and 22
participants in the small room.
Results

Situative Creativity

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all problem solvinvention
the intercorrelations
between participants’
problemShape
solving
task performance measures, collapsed
ing measures. Table
2 shows the intercorrelations
between
participants’ problem solving task performance measures, Participants in the large room generated slightly more invenExperiments
In general,
the correlations
were
in the
(e.g.,
collapsed acrossacross
Experiments
1 and12.and
In 2.
general,
the correlations (M
= 5.5,
SE =expected
.42) thandirections
participants
in the small room (M
tions were in the expected directions (e.g., significant positive = 4.6, SE = .41), d = 0.47 [-0.17, 1.11], but this difference was not
correlations between divergent
significant positive statistically significant, F(1,41) = 2.3, p = .13. However, there
Tablemeasures;
1
Table 1
Descriptive
statistics
experiment
Descriptive
statistics
forfor
Experiment
1. 1.

Divergent measures
Uses fluency
Uses novelty mean
Uses novelty max
Invention fluency
Invention novelty mean
Invention novelty max
Convergent measures
Uses practicality
Invention practicality
RAT
Letters
Table 2

Mean

Median

22.07
1.67
3.12
5.07
2.74
3.58

21
1.59
3
5
2.83
3.67

7
1
1
2
1.56
2

42
2.58
4
9
3.83
4

1.32
0.06
0.13
0.29
0.08
0.08

2.62
3.15
0.59
0.61

2.64
3.21
0.62
0.71

2.03
1.79
0
0

3
3.86
1
1

0.04
0.06
0.04
0.05
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Letters

0.61

0.71

0

1

0.05
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Intercorrelations between measures, collapsed across Experiments 1 and 2.
Table 2
Intercorrelations between measures, collapsed across Experiments 1 and 2.
Divergent
Convergent
Uses Uses
Invent Invent
novel novel Invent novel novel
Uses
Invent
mean max
fluen. mean max
pract. pract. RAT
U fluency
0.50* 0.50* 0.37* 0.24* 0.26*
-0.43* -0.07
-0.04
U novel mean
0.79* 0.31* 0.27* 0.29*
-0.89* -0.02
0.01
U novel max
0.17* 0.25* 0.22*
-0.66* 0.01
0.03
I fluency
0.09
0.46*
-0.32* 0.00
-0.07
I novel mean
0.75*
-0.23* -0.11
-0.02
I novel max
-0.28* -0.05
-0.01
U practicality
0.06
-0.06
I practicality
0.14m
RAT
m
p < .10; * p < .05

Letters
-0.01
-0.04
-0.12
-0.06
-0.03
-0.02
0.00
0.00
0.21*

significant positive correlations between divergent measures; significant positive correlations
was an effect of room
size on mean novelty, with participants in lower self-reported difficulty in the large (M = 5.2, SE = 0.3)
the large room, on average, creating more novel inventions (M vs. small room (M = 6.8, SE = 0.3), d = -1.16 [-1.81, -0.51],
= 2.9, SE = .10) than participants in the small room (M F(1,45) = 15.7, p = 0.00.
= 2.6, SE = .10), d = 0.76 [0.10, 1.41], F(1,41) = 6.2, p = .02.
In contrast, for the RAT, participants in the large room
Similarly, there was an effect of max novelty, with the most self-reported about the same levels of perceived difficulty
novel inventions of participants in the large room being, on (M = 7.1, SE = .30) as participants in the small room (M
average, more novel (M = 3.8, SE = .10) than the most novel = 7.4, SE = .29), d = -0.16 [-0.77, 0.43], F(1,45) = 0.34, p = .56.
inventions of participants in the small room (M = 3.4, SE Similarly, for the letters task, participants in the large room
= .10), d = 0.76 [0.10, 1.41], F(1,41) = 6.2, p = .02. For practi- self-reported about the same levels of perceived difficulty (M
cality, there was no effect of room size, with inventions from = 6.3, SE = .36) as participants in the small room (M = 5.9, SE
the large room condition about as practical (M = 3.2, SE = .36), d = 0.24 [-0.37, 0.84], F(1,45) = 0.65, p = .42.
= .08) as those from the small room (M = 3.1, SE = .08), d
Positive and negative affect
= 0.32 [-0.31, 0.96], F(1,41) = 1.1, p = .29.
There was no effect of room size on positive affect, with parRAT
ticipants in the large room self-reporting about the same
There was no effect of room size, with participants in the levels of positive affect (M = 27.6, SE = 1.5) as participants
large room having about the same mean proportion cor- in the small room (M = 27.4, SE = 1.5), d = 0.04 [-0.59,
rect (M = .57, SE = .05) as participants in the small room (M 0.68], F(1,41) = 0.02, p = .89. Similarly, there was no effect
= .60, SE = .05), d = -0.12 [-0.75, 0.51], F(1,41) = 0.2, p = .69. of room size on negative affect, with participants in the large
room self-reporting about the same levels of negative affect (M
Letter series
= 12.3, SE = .47) as participants in the small room (M = 11.8,
Participants in the large room generated a slightly higher SE = .46), d = 0.22 [-0.41, 0.86], F(1,41) = 0.53, p = .47.
proportion of correct responses (M = .65, SE = .07) than
participants in the small room (M = .57, SE = .07), d = 0.22 Discussion
[-0.41, 0.85], but this difference was not statistically signifi- Experiment 1 yielded evidence consistent with Hypothesis 1
cant, F(1,41) = .05, p = .48.
(see Figure 5 for a summary of the observed effects). As predicted, participants’ performance was higher on the diverPerceived task difficulty
gent problem solving measures in the larger room than in the
There was a marginal effect of room size on perceived dif- smaller room (e.g., uses fluency, uses novelty, invention novficulty for the uses task, with participants in the large room elty). In contrast, we found only partial support for Hypothesis
self-reporting slightly lower levels of difficulty (M = 4.1, SE 2, that is, that participants in the large rooms would perform
= .36) compared to participants in the small room (M = 5.1, worse on convergence measures than participants in the small
SE = .36), d = -0.53 [-1.15, 0.08], F(1,45) = 3.4, p = .07. For rooms. Consistent with the hypothesis, we found that particthe invention task, there was a main effect of room size, with ipants in the larger room showed lower performance on the
docs.lib.purdue.edu/jps
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Figure44. Novelty and practicality of alternative uses by room size in Experiment
Figure
Novelty and practicality of alternative uses by room size in Experiment 1. Error bars are ±1 SE.

1. Error

bars are ±1 SE.

uses practicality measure. However, no differences were found large room or problem solving stimuli. To this end, we slightly
across the two groups on invention practicality and perfor- altered the large room manipulation from Experiment 1 (parmance on
the RATletter
and letter
series
the general significant
discus- ticipants
sat at
the top of thebetween
auditorium
rather than at the botbetween
series
andtask.
RATInmeasures;
negative
correlations
uses
sion we discuss possible reasons for why we did not observe tom), and added a second new large room that had a lower
stronger negative effects of a large space on convergence mea- ceiling height but was still spacious horizontally. To maximize
practicality and the divergent measures). However, the correlations are generally low, explaining
sures. Taken together, these results show that the benefits of the statistical power, we treated them as a single condition in our
larger room for divergent performance were not simply due to analyses.2 We also changed the objects used for the uses task,
amounts
variance,
and some
arecategories
missing and
(e.g.,
no significant
as well as the
shapes
used for the invention task.
a generalsmall
facilitation
effectofofcommon
being in the
larger room;
rather,correlations
there seems to be a specific effect of being in a larger room on
Methods
correlations
practicality
and the letters series
and RAT measures, and no significant
the cognitive
processesbetween
that enable
divergent performance.
Analysis of the additional measures yielded additional
invention
practicality
of the other measures). This suggests that the
insights.correlations
In support ofbetween
Hypotheses
3, the perceived
taskand
dif-anyParticipants
ficulty results suggest that participants in the larger room not One hundred and nine undergraduates (61 females; ages
measuresbetter
do not
the two
constructs
divergence
and in
convergence
only performed
on necessarily
the uses andprimarily
inventionreflect
tasks (in
18–31,
averageofage
19) enrolled
Introduction to PsySituative Creativity
terms of divergent performance measures), but also found chology at a large research university in the northeastern
the task(as
overall
to be
less cognitively
taxing (compared
to each measure separately.
we had
hypothesized).
Therefore,
we analyze
participants in the smaller rooms), suggesting that some
of the performance benefits might be due to unconscious
mechanisms (e.g., automatic attunement of semantic search
patternsAlternative
to search affordances
in the physical environment).
uses
Further, analysis of the survey responses for PANAS suggests
that the differences are not explained by positive boosts to
There was an effect of room size on mean fluency, with participants in the large room
affect in the larger room (or increased negative affect in the
smaller room). This result is consistent with the direct primgenerating more uses (M = 25.0, SE = 1.8) than participants in the small room (M = 19.3, SE =
ing hypothesis and not the concept activation account.

24

1.8), d2:=REPLICATION
0.68, 95% CI
= [0.03,
1.33], F(1,41) = 5.0, p = .03. There was also an effect of room
EXPERIMENT
AND
EXTENSION
size
on mean
novelty,
withwe
participants
the large room producing higher mean novelty with
Given the
novelty
of our
hypotheses,
conducted in
a second
study to replicate and extend the results of Experiment 1. The
Figure 5. Summary of effects in Experiment 1. Error bars are 95% CIs.
focus of the extension is to ensure that the effects were not Figure
5
due to idiosyncrasies of the particular configurations of the Summary of effects in Experiment 1. Error bars are 95% CIs.

showed lower performance on the uses practicality measure. However, no differences were found
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across the two groups on invention practicality
and performance
the RAT and
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task. In the general discussion we discuss possible reasons for why we did not observe stronger
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United States participated in this study. All participants were
recruited through the university’s psychology subject pool,
and were compensated with course credit.
Three participants (assigned to the large rooms) did not
produce any valid responses to the invention task, and were
dropped from all analyses, leaving us with 106 total participants in our final dataset.3
Materials

and “TABLE.” A different set of categories and shapes were
randomly sampled for the invention task, using the same
procedure as in Experiment 1. The new categories were
“Transportation,” “Furniture,” and “Weapons,” and the new
shapes were “rectangular block,” “ring,” and “half-sphere”
(see Figure 7).

Dependent measures
Situative Creativity

As in Experiment 1, we obtained measures of fluency and
Room size manipulation. In this study, the “large” setting
of the
ourexperiment. The dimensions of the room were the same as in Experiment 1,
out for
novelty for both the uses and invention tasks. Inter-rater reliroom size manipulation included two different rooms: 1)
ability was high for novelty scoring across both tasks, ICC(2,2)
the same conference auditorium as in Experiment
1, with 8′ W × 10′ L × 8′ H. As in Experiment 1, participants completed their tas
approximately
= .83 for uses novelty, and ICC(2,3) = .84 for invention novthe only difference being that participants sat at the top of the
elty. We then aggregated scores at the participant level into
facing one of the walls. It was empty except for the desk and chair the participants
room, rather than the bottom of the room, and desk
2) another
mean and max novelty. Also as in Experiment 1, we evaluated
conference room in the same building (see Figure 6). The
uses and inventions
practicality.
Inter-rater completed
reliability was
tasks. As infor
Experiment
1, participants
the alternativ
dimensions of the new large room were approximately 15’Problem-solving
W
high for uses practicality, ICC(2,2) = .82, and acceptable for
× 30’ L × 8’ H. Other than the desk and chair the participants
invention
.67.differences
We then from
aggregated
shape invention,
RAT, andpracticality,
letter series ICC(2,4)
tasks. The =only
Experiment 1 a
used, along with the other desks and chairs in the room, the
scores into participant-level measures of mean uses and
room was empty. Note also that the lighting herethe
is stimuli
fluores-for the alternative uses and shape invention tasks. The objects used for the al
invention practicality. Both the RAT and letter series tasks
cent, similar to the small rooms in both experiments.
were scored identically to Experiment 1 (i.e., percent correct).
The “small” room was another former office space
in the
uses were
“CUP” and “TABLE.” A different set of categories and shapes were randomly
same building that was emptied out for the experiment. Procedure
The dimensions of the room were the same as in Experiment
for the invention task, using the same procedure as in Experiment 1. The new categories
1, approximately 8’ W × 10’ L × 8’ H. As in Experiment 1, The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, except that partic“Furniture,” and “Weapons,” and the new shapes were “rectangular b
participants completed their tasks on a desk facing“Transportation,”
one of the ipants
did not complete the PANAS measurement at any point.
walls. It was empty except for the desk and chair the partici“ring,” and “half-sphere” (see Fig. 7).
pants used.
Design

Problem-solving tasks. As in Experiment 1, participants completed the alternative uses, shape invention, RAT, and let- This experiment had a between-subjects design. The independent variable was room size, with two levels (large or
Dependent
ter series tasks. The only differences from Experiment
1 aremeasures
with the stimuli for the alternative uses and shape invention small). Participants were randomly assigned to conditions.
As in Experiment 1, we
eativity
26obtained measures of fluency and novelty for both the u
tasks. The objects used for the alternative uses were “CUP” In the final dataset, there were 68 participants in the large
rooms and 38 participants in the small room.

invention tasks. Inter-rater reliability was high for novelty scoring across both tasks, IC

Results

.83 for uses novelty, and ICC(2,3) = .84 for invention novelty. We then aggregated score

Descriptive statistics for all measures are shown in Table 3.

participant level
into that
meanperformance
and max novelty.
as in Experiment
1, we
evaluated use
Note
on Also
all divergent
measures
(except

for uses fluency) was significantly lower than that observed

inventions for practicality.
Inter-rater
high for uses
in Experiment
1. In reliability
contrast, was
performance
on practicality,
the practi-ICC(2,2)

cality measures for both the uses and invention tasks were

and acceptable for invention practicality, ICC(2,4) = .67. We then aggregated scores into

Figure6 6. Picture of new large room in Experiment 2.
Figure
Picture of new large room in Experiment 2.

Figure 7. Shapes for invention task in Experiment 2.
Figure 7
Shapes for invention task in Experiment 2.
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Table 3

Table 3
Descriptive
statistics
for Experiment
2.
Descriptive
statistics
for experiment
2.
Mean
Median Min Max SE
Uses fluency
19.93
19
6
37
0.69
Uses novelty mean
1.38 V
1.35
1
2.12 0.02
Uses novelty max
2.77 V
3
1
4
0.08
Invention fluency
3.51 V
3
1
13
0.21
Invention novelty mean
2.51 V
2.52
1.25 3.78 0.05
Invention novelty max
3.17 V
3.33
1.67 4
0.07
Uses practicality
2.83 ^
2.86
2.47 3
0.01
Invention practicality
3.43 ^
3.50
1.5
4.33 0.04
RAT
0.56
0.55
0
1
0.02
Letters
0.50 V
0.52
0
0.78 0.01
V
p < .05 lower than Experiment 1; ^ p < .05 higher than Experiment 1.
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= 2.9, SE = 0.1) compared to the small room (M = 2.6, SE
= 0.1), d = 0.37 [-0.03, 0.78], F(1,104) = 3.4, p = .07 (Fig. 8,
middle panel).
Similar to Experiment 1, there was an effect of room size
on uses practicality, F(1,104) = 4.1, p = .04, with participants
in the larger rooms generating less practical uses (M = 2.8,
SE = 0.01) than participants in the small room (M = 2.9, SE
= 0.02), d = -0.41 [-0.82, 0.00] (Fig 8, right panel).

Shape invention
There was no effect of room size on mean fluency, F(1,104)
= 0.9, p = .36, with participants in the large room generating
about the same number of inventions (M = 3.4, SE = 0.3) as
participants in the small room (M = 3.8, SE = 0.3), d = -0.19
[-0.59, 0.22]. In contrast to Experiment 1, there were no relisignificantly higher than in Experiment 1. However, letters able effects of room size on novelty of inventions: Participants
Alternative uses
performance was also lower than in Experiment 1. We return in the larger rooms had similar mean novelty scores (M = 2.5,
Into
contrast
to Experiment
1, there was when
no effect
of room size on
fluency, F(1,1
SE = 0.1) as participants in the small room (M = 2.5, SE = 0.1),
this issue
in the discussion
interpreting
themean
relationd = 0.14 [-0.26, 0.55], F(1,104) = 0.5, p = .49. Similarly, particiship between the results across the two experiments.
04) = 0.4, p = .53, with participants in the large rooms generating about the same number of uses
pants in the larger rooms achieved about the same max novelty
Alternative uses
scores (M = 3.2, SE = 0.1) as participants in the small room (M
M = 20.3, SE = 0.9) as participants in the small room (M = 19.3, SE = 1.2), d = 0.13 [-0.28,
In contrast to Experiment 1, there was no effect of room size = 3.1, SE = 0.1), d = 0.06 [-0.35, 0.46], F(1,104) = 0.1, p = 0.79.
0.54]. In contrast,
similar
to Experiment
1, mean
trends
novelty
uses were in the
on mean
fluency,
F(1,1 04)
= 0.4,
p =for
.53,
withofparticipants
in
There was no effect of room size on invention practicalthe
large
rooms
generating
about
the
same
number
of
uses
(M
ity,
hypothesized direction. However, the mean differences did not reach statistical significance. with participants in the large room generating inventions
= 20.3, SE = 0.9) as participants in the small room (M that were about as practical (M = 3.4, SE = 0.1) as particiMean novelty
of usesSE
was=nonsignificantly
in the
large In
room
(M = 1.4, similar
SE = 0.0) pants in the small room (M = 3.5, SE = 0.1), d = -0.15 [-0.56,
= 19.3,
1.2), d = 0.13higher
[-0.28,
0.54].
contrast,
to
Experiment
1,
mean
trends
for
novelty
of
uses
were
in 0.25],
compared to the small room (M = 1.3, SE = 0.0), d = 0.34 [-0.07, 0.75], F(1,104) = 2.8, p =
.10 F(1,104) = 0.6, p = .46.
the hypothesized direction. However, the mean differences
Fig. 8, leftdid
panel).
novelty
was marginally
higher in the
large novelty
rooms (M of
= 2.9,
SE = RAT
0.1)
notMax
reach
statistical
significance.
Mean
uses
was nonsignificantly higher in the large room (M = 1.4, SE There was no effect of room size, F(1,104) = 0.02, p = .90.
compared to the small room (M = 2.6, SE = 0.1), d = 0.37 [-0.03, 0.78], F(1,104) = 3.4, p = .07
= 0.0) compared to the small room (M = 1.3, SE = 0.0), d Participants in the larger rooms had about the same mean
= 0.34
[-0.07, 0.75], F(1,104) = 2.8, p = .10 (Fig. 8, left panel). proportion correct (M = .56, SE = .03) as participants in the
Fig. 8, middle
panel).
Situative
Creativity higher in the large rooms (M small room (M = .55, SE = .04), d = 0.03 [-0.37, 0.43].
30
Max novelty
was marginally
Similar to Experiment 1, there was an effect of room size on uses practicality, F(1,104)

= 4.1, p = .04, with participants in the larger rooms generating less practical uses (M = 2.8, SE =

Figure
8 8. Novelty and practicality of alternative uses by room size in Experiment
Figure
Novelty and practicality of alternative uses by room size in Experiment 2. Error bars are ±1 SE.

bars are ±1 SE.
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There was no effect of room size, F(1,104) = 0.07, p = .79.
Participants in the larger rooms had about the same mean
proportion correct (M = .50, SE = .02) as participants in the
small room (M = .50, SE = .02), d = -0.05 [-0.46, 0.35].
Perceived task difficulty
In contrast to Experiment 1, there was no effect of room size
on perceived difficulty for the uses task, F(1,104) = 0.0, p
= .98. Participants in the larger rooms self-reported the same
levels of cognitive load (M = 5.1, SE = .18) as participants in
the small room (M = 5.1, SE = .24), d = -0.00 [-0.40, 0.41].
Similarly, for the invention task, participants self-reported
the same level of difficulty in the large (M = 5.9, SE = 0.21)
and small rooms (M = 5.9, SE = 0.28), d = -0.00 [–0.41, 0.40],
F(1,104) = 0.0, p = 0.98.
Results were the same as Experiment 1 for the RAT and
letters tasks. For the RAT, perceived difficulty was about the
same in the large (M = 7.5, SE = 0.15) and small rooms (M
= 7.3, SE = 0.20), d = 0.13 [-0.28, 0.53], F(1,104) = 0.4, p = 0.53.
Similarly, perceived difficulty of the letters task was the same
in the large (M = 0.50, SE = 0.02) and small rooms (M = 0.50,
SE = 0.02), d = -0.05 [-0.46, 0.35], F(1,104) = 0.1, p = 0.79.
Discussion

In Experiment 2, we sought to replicate and extend the
findings from Experiment 1. See Figure 8 for a summary
of the effects. We observed very similar patterns of effects
for the alternative uses, RAT, and letter series tasks. Similar
to Experiment 1, novelty (both mean and max) of uses was
higher in the larger vs. small room, although the effect size
was substantially smaller than Experiment 1 (approximately
half the size). These trends are in the predicted direction of
tuative Creativity
Hypothesis 1, and consistent with both the direct priming

Figure 9. Summary of effects in Experiment 2. Error bars are 95% CIs.

Figure 9
Summary of effects in Experiment 2. Error bars are 95% CIs.
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and concept activation accounts. Overall performance on
the divergent measures were worse in both conditions in this
experiment compared to Experiment 1, which may suggest
floor effects. In the general discussion we further consider
possible reasons for the partial replication.
Partial support and replication was found for Hypothesis
2, with participants in the large room showing worse performance on the practicality measure of the alternative uses task
compared to those in the small room. Also similar to Experiment 1, there was no effect of room size on the RAT or letter
series task. However, perceived difficulty patterns did not replicate from Experiment 1. The failure to replicate the difference
in perceived difficulty means that findings do not support the
direct priming hypothesis more so than the concept activation
account. In sum, we observed a partial replication of the results
in Experiment 1 (mainly with novelty and practicality of uses).

GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this paper, we sought to explore the potential cognitive
bases of the spatial metaphor that initial exploration of a
creative space should be “broad.” Across two experiments,
we tested the hypothesis that larger physical spaces facilitate
divergent, but not convergent, processes in problem-solving.
Experiment 1 provided support for Hypothesis 1 and 2, and
Experiment 2 partially replicated the findings. Smaller room
sizes facilitated the generation of more practical uses of
everyday objects across both experiments. Larger room sizes
facilitated the generation of more novel uses of everyday
objects (specifically mean and max novelty) in Experiment
1; although the same trends were seen in Experiment 2, the
effects did not reach significance.
As noted in our discussion of the descriptive statistics in
32
Experiment
2, there was a significant drop in performance
across many of our measures from Experiment 1, suggesting that there may have been important differences in the
two samples. One potential explanation is that Experiment
2 participants were exclusively undergraduate students participating for course credit, whereas Experiment 1 participants were paid volunteers and included a wider range of
demographics (not just undergraduate students). Reduced
motivation may have led to floor effects, potentially reducing
the sensitivity of our measures. Motivation differences might
have been especially important since we did not provide
direct instructions to “be creative” in either experiment. For
example, while the mean rated novelty of alternative uses was
close to “not at all novel” across both experiments, the mean
and variability was higher in Experiment 1 (M = 1.67, SD
= 0.42) compared to Experiment 2 (M = 1.38, SD = 0.24). The
generally low novelty scores (and high practicality scores)
with relatively low variance suggest that participants were
in general defaulting to more convergent processing. This

3, SE = 0.20), d = 0.13 [-0.28, 0.53], F(1,104) = 0.4, p = 0.53. Similarly, perceived difficulty
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the letters task was the same in the large (M = 0.50, SE = 0.02) and small
rooms (M = 0.50, SE

0.02), d = -0.05 [-0.46, 0.35], F(1,104) = 0.1, p = 0.79.
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observation is consistent with prior research on the “path
of least resistance” in creative production (Ward, 1994), and
other work that has shown that instructions to “be creative”
can yield substantial improvements to creative output (Nusbaum, Silvia, & Beaty, 2014): People generally need to expend
cognitive effort to overcome initial biases toward less creative responses (e.g., using cognitive control to inhibit more
accessible but less creative responses; Beaty, Silvia, Nusbaum,
Jauk, & Benedek, 2014). In light of this, it may be useful to
think of these results as describing the effects of room size
on “default” problem solving (i.e., when participants are not
necessarily actively trying to be creative in their responses).
We believe that pooling the data from the two experiments provides the clearest picture (e.g., robust across a
wide range of participants and problem solving stimuli) of
whether there is a relationship between room size and divergent and convergent problem solving processes. The pooled
data indicate reliable evidence that larger physical spaces
facilitate novelty and hinder practicality of solutions on the
alternative uses task (see Figure 9). In the pooled data, mean
novelty of uses is higher in the larger rooms (M = 1.5, SE
= 0.03) compared to the small rooms (M = 1.4, SE = 0.04),
d = 0.34 [0.01, 0.67], F(1,147) = 4.13, p = .04. Similarly, max
novelty of uses is higher in the larger rooms (M = 3.0, SE
= 0.09) compared to the small rooms (M = 2.7, SE = 0.11), d
= 0.37 [0.04, 0.71], F(1,147) = 5.13, p = .03. In contrast, mean
practicality of uses was lower in the larger rooms (M = 2.7,
SE = 0.02) compared to the small rooms (M = 2.8, SE = 0.02),
d = -0.38 [-0.71, -0.04], F(1,147) = 5.11, p = .03.
Our primary goal in this study is to document a psychologSituative Creativity
ical phenomenon:
We provide an initial test of whether there
is an association between room size and divergent problem

solving performance. While this effect appears to be relatively
small and may depend on having sufficiently motivated participants, some aspects of our results provide hints for future
theoretical refinement. While our results from the problem
solving measures (and non-replication of the hypothesized
perceived task difficulty results from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2) are consistent with both a direct priming explanation
(Hills, 2006; Hills et al., 2008, 2012), as well as the concept
activation explanation (Meyers-Levy & Zhu, 2007), the affect
results in Experiment 1 help to partially arbitrate between
the explanations. The lack of effect on positive/negative affect
is more consistent with a direct priming explanation, since
concepts of “freedom” or “openness” are expected to engender more positive affect, whereas attunement to resource
distribution patterns are not. We therefore suggest that, to
the extent that this effect proves reliable, it may be a consequence of automatic attunement of semantic search patterns
to search affordances in the physical environment. That is,
people may be responding to the physical search affordances
of the physical environment by defocusing their attention to
enable broader search in semantic memory, shifting from a
tight focus on a few highly relevant responses to considering more semantically distant and varied responses. However,
alternative explanations are possible: For example, it is possible that the small room reminded people of traditional office
environments, which may have invoked a “work schema” that
primed more focused attention, impairing divergent thinking. Further investigations are necessary to tease apart the
psychological underpinnings of this effect.
Although we intended the letter series task and RAT to be
35based on
measures of convergent problem solving processes
the nature of the response required (many = divergent, single

Figure
10. Novelty and practicality of alternative uses by room size, pooled across
Figure
10
Novelty and practicality of alternative uses by room size, pooled across experiments. Error bars are ±1 SE.
experiments. Error bars are ±1 SE.
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= convergent), in hindsight, it is probably best to consider both
the RAT and the letter series task as a more even mix of divergent and convergent processes than the fluency and novelty
measures for the uses and invention tasks (which quite cleanly
measure divergent processes). For example, in the RAT, one
might first search broadly for possible meanings (strong and
weak associates) of the target words and then only later converge on the common target that links across all three. Similarly,
the letter series task may first require divergent search for several possible patterns before converging on the single, correct
pattern to extrapolate. The mixture of both divergent and convergent processes in the letter series task and RAT might explain
why we did not find a harmful effect of large rooms on letter
series and RAT performance, and why we only found a harmful
effect of large rooms on practicality of uses (which turned out
empirically to be our cleanest measures of convergent processes,
based on the intercorrelations between measures).
Our data have broader implications for the psychology of
creative problem solving. For example, our observed strong
negative correlations between novelty and practicality of
uses corroborate prior arguments that originality and practicality in creative thought are cognitively at odds with each
other (Goldenberg et al., 2013). Our results also have implications for how we should think about the RAT as a measure
of creativity. In this study, we departed from a number of
prior studies that have examined the divergent aspects of the
RAT, for example, studying the relationship between defocused attention and RAT performance (Aiello et al., 2012;
Haarmann et al., 2012). However, the differing patterns of
results and lack of correlation between the RAT and divergent problem solving measures for the invention and uses
task suggest that the RAT may involve more convergence
than is typically described. Noting these findings might lead
to more fruitful theoretical examinations of the relationship between the RAT and problem solving and creativity.
For example, Goel, Eimontaite, Goel, and Schindler (2015)
recently argued that insight problems (such as the RAT) are
a subset of well-structured problems, while divergent problem solving tasks (such as the alternative uses and invention
tasks) are a subset of ill-structured problems. Our results also
echo a number of recent studies that have demonstrated the
psychological separability of divergent and convergent problem solving processes (Chermahini & Hommel, 2010; Colzato et al., 2012; Hommel, Colzato, Fischer, & Christoffels,
2011; Oppezzo & Schwartz, 2014; Radel et al., 2015). We join
these more nuanced arguments to call for more careful analyses of the components of creative performance (e.g., separating divergent vs. convergent processes) in future research
on creativity.

Notes
Results are the same with partial data from these participants included.
2
There were no statistical differences between participants in
the two large rooms on any of the measures.
3
Results are the same with partial data from these participants included.
1
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B:ITEMS
FULLFOR
LIST
OF ITEMS
FOR LETTER SERIES TASK
APPENDIX APPENDIX
B: FULL LIST OF
LETTER
SERIES TASK
1. aaabbbcccdd __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
2. atbataatbat __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
3. abmcdmefmghm __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
4. defgefghfghi __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
5. qxapxbqxa __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
6. aduacuaeuabuafua __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
7. mabmbcmcdm __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
8. urtustuttu __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
9. abyabxabwab __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
10. rscdstdetuef __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
11. npaoqapraqsa __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
12. wxaxybyzczadab __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
13. jkqrklrslmst __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
14. pononmnmlmlk __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
15. lmzmlymnx __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
16. efsferfgq __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
17. cdqdcpdeo __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
18. ijwjivjku __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
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